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ABSTRACT 
The 1959 discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea provides the analyst with an oppor-
tunity to observe the design of institutions governing the extraction of natural resources. Three 
states – the UK, the Netherlands and Norway – all industrialized, constitutional monarchies, 
faced significant political, economic and technical challenges in managing their new-found re-
sources. All three states shared similar histories and yet designed different institutions to govern 
the extraction process. The wide variation creates a most-similar systems comparison, lending 
itself to guided, constructed, qualitative analysis. This analysis shows that regime preferences, 
domestic demand and international prices are significant variables in explaining the choice of 
level of state participation in the extraction process. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Resource 'curses' have been widely studied and blamed for the ills of industrially devel-
oping and newly democratic states. Advice about resource extraction policies abound, their au-
thors frequently citing evidence from other developing states. Much less studied is the impact of 
a resource windfall on states with established democracies and industrialized economies.  Partic-
ularly when considering the balance between private actor and state control of such resources, 
examination of how well-established democracies have assembled new institutions can offer val-
uable insight into how newer democracies or states in transition can reach not only political 
goals, but social and economic welfare goals. It can also offer private economic actors more pre-
dictive analysis of where investment might be more sound, or more risky.  The discovery of re-
source windfalls in democratized and industrialized states is unusual even when only considering 
single state cases. If the analyst is seeking an opportunity to examine several cases under rela-
tively controlled conditions, the natural experiment arises in the North Sea.  
In 1959, vast natural gas reserves were discovered in the Dutch portion of the North Sea, 
Slochterens.  A 1965 discovery of oil followed in the United Kingdom's and Norway's portions.  
The discoveries of oil and natural gas in the North Sea present the analyst with a unique oppor-
tunity to comparatively examine the reaction of states to resource windfalls.  The oil and gas 
finds of the North Sea overlap territorial water holdings of several states.  Boundary lines among 
the seven sharing states (the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Belgium and France) had been established as part of the Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf of 1958 (Dam, 1965): in terms of production, the most significant of these states are the 
United Kingdom and Norway, followed by the Netherlands and Germany.   
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The Convention on the Continental Shelf allowed each of these states to take individual 
approaches to management of their resource windfalls, which they did.  The UK initially fol-
lowed a laissez-faire, market-oriented approach of licensing private companies to explore for oil 
and gas within the British territorial waters, and anticipated taxing the product found and landed 
by the exploring companies.  There were also some small auctions of licenses which were sold to 
the highest qualified bidders. While there was some small direct participation of the state in oil 
exploration and development, by and large, Britain contented itself to tax the oil found and sold, 
rather than sell it itself.  
Norway, on the other hand, formed a state owned oil company, Statoil, in 1972.  Statoil 
not only began to carry out exploration in the North Sea, but also served to "...substitute for 
[state] participation in production agreements..." (Klapp, 1982, p. 586) with multinational oil 
corporations to which Norway had already granted exploration and development licenses.  
Statoil was not the controlling partner in the initial period of North Sea production: its initial par-
ticipation level was only 20%, setting up a public-private institution with a proviso that Statoil 
would become the dominant producer in Norwegian seas.  Between 1972 and 1985 this initial 
participation level of 20% would rise to 75%, and would accomplish the de facto nationalization 
of Norwegian oil.   
 The Netherlands, however, had avoided direct, state-owned extraction of the resources in 
the ground in favor of allowing Royal Dutch Shell, the discovering firm of the natural gas re-
sources, to form a joint venture with Esso (now ExxonMobil).  This firm, Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij (NAM), would extract the gas under monopoly conditions and sell it under monop-
sony, to the pipeline, infrastructure and transportation firm Gasunie, a partnership between NAM 
and the Dutch government.  The joint venture was overseen by Dutch State Mines, the govern-
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ment ministry in charge of mining.  The Dutch government taxed the product and transactions 
heavily, participated directly in the transportation of product, including transportation from sea-
bed to terminal, but left sub-surface to seabed extraction in the hands of private actors. 
Clearly, there were and are significant differences between British, Dutch and Norwegian 
approaches to managing their resource windfalls.  What is particularly interesting is that all three 
states have broadly similar political structures. All three are parliamentary, constitutional monar-
chies, well established democracies, and have similar historical experiences, particularly in terms 
of experiences in World War II and participation in (if not membership in) the EU and EEA.  All 
are northern European states, and had relatively homogeneous populations at the time.  
How might the analyst explain the wide difference in the initial approach to management 
of resource windfalls?  Windfalls offer a particularly striking opportunity to examine how these 
institutions are constructed in comparison to how institutions have evolved.  Windfalls offer a 
dividing point in time:  before the windfall was known, and after.  This allows the analyst to look 
at the set of institutional arrangements that govern market and political behavior before the wind-
fall to see how well they match to the institutional arrangements governing the windfall.  The 
cusp-point of time allows the analyst to answer questions about state preferences for profit max-
imization and distribution, and to draw inferences about the preferences of the actors within the 
state from those institutions.  Windfalls also offer an opportunity to examine institution for-
mation in industrialized, democratic states per se, not as advisors to other states. 
Three strong variables determining the structure of resource extraction governing institutions 
emerge: the ideology of the governing regime at the time of discovery, the international prices of 
the product discovered, and the domestic demand for the product just discovered.  At the time of 
discovery, all three states' governments were considered center-left governments.  However, 
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Norwegian center-left is considerably different from Dutch center-left, and both are different 
from British center-left.  This allows ideology to continue as an explanatory variable.  There was 
also significant variation in both the international product prices and the domestic product de-
mand in all three states.  Taken in combination with assumptions about government preferences 
about rent-seeking and re-election, domestic demand and international prices help explain the 
type of institutions initially designed by Northern European democracies to govern the extraction 
of their windfall. 
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2.     LITERATURE REVIEW: INSITTUTIONAL DESIGN, RESOURCE EXTRAC-
TION AND THE NORTH SEA 
Windfalls offer a particularly striking opportunity to examine how these institutions are con-
structed in comparison to how institutions have evolved.  Windfalls offer a dividing point in 
time:  before the windfall was known, and after.  This allows the analyst to look at the set of in-
stitutional arrangements that govern market and political behavior before the windfall to see how 
well they match to the institutional arrangements governing the windfall.  The cusp-point of time 
allows the analyst to answer questions about state preferences for profit maximization and distri-
bution, and to draw inferences about the preferences of the actors within the state from those in-
stitutions.   
2.1 Institutional Design 
Two major theories dominate the institutional design literature: modernization, path de-
pendency and rational choice. Modernization focuses on developing and democratizing states, 
which are excluded from this work.  Under path dependency, the dominant independent variable 
explaining institutional design is the preferences of regimes.  Following Moore (1966), Skocpol 
(1979), and Pierson (1996 and 2000), these regimes’ preferences would be built over time, as a 
function of the historical conditions under which the actors matured.  The arc of time would 
culminate in an institutional design that reflects those preferences and the path taken to build 
those preferences.  Close examination of these preferences in comparative perspective in North-
ern Europe is the focus of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work, with its particularly useful method of 
ranking relative preferences of governments at an aggregate level. 
The other dominant theory of institutional design is rational choice.  Under rational 
choice theory, the dominant explanatory variables for explaining the design of institutions gov-
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erning resource extraction should be the levels of international prices and domestic demand for 
that resource.  Initial global conditions would determine the volume of taxes the government 
could expect to generate from production and exports.  Domestic demand, on the other hand, 
should determine the volume of cost savings that industry no longer would need to spend on im-
ported energy supplies.  Under pure rational choice, the governing regime should design institu-
tions that, per Downs (1957), Arrow (1963), Olson (1965), and Rogowski (1989), maximize the 
likelihood of re-election, maintenance of and buildup of power. 
2.2 Natural Resource Extraction and the North Sea 
Overall, the literature concerning the formation of institutions governing natural resource 
extraction falls into two groups. The first group focuses on product, theorizing that the institution 
formed depends on what the resource is.  Almost all of these works title themselves as 'oil and 
gas,' or use the two products interchangeably in their bodies, but proceed to provide evidence for 
their positions that are focused on single products (e.g. oil or gas) oil production, without signifi-
cant exploration of issues related to production of substitutes (e.g. gas for oil and vice versa).   
The second group of literature is case specific, theorizing that the institution formed de-
pends on the country in which the resource is found.  In this work, the first group of literature is 
concerned with the specific North Sea energy products: oil and gas. The second group of litera-
ture is concerned with the specific experiences of North Sea states.  Each group has advantages 
and disadvantages, leaving space for the analyst to explore alternative explanations. Both of 
these categories, by and large, date from the period surrounding the discovery. This means that 
the bulk of the literature predates the works of Keohane, North and Ostrom. The work of these 
authors, particularly, formulates theories about the formation of institutions that integrate politi-
cal and economic variables.  
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The first category of literature of the North Sea oil seeks to explain regime preferences 
for characteristics of extraction. This literature is single-product: it seeks to explain either oil 
production or gas production, not explain both oil and gas production in the same work.  It is typ-
ified by the works of Andersen, Correlje, Odell, Dam, Lind, D.I. MacKay, G.A MacKay, and 
Noreng.   
Andersen (1993), for example, seeks to explain the policy choices made by Danish, Brit-
ish and Norwegian governments about extracting oil.  He focuses on an institutional approach, 
writing that "...comprehensive policy paradigms play a key role in shaping governmental strate-
gies" (Andersen, 1993, p. 12).  Andersen uses political culture to explain why Denmark focused 
on speed in extracting its oil, why the British engaged in radical policy changes reflecting "...that 
the two major poitical parties hold different models of state roles in the economy" (Ibid., p. 10), 
and why the Norwegians took a go-slow approach, allowing for significant state roles in the ex-
traction regime.  Andersen's unit-heterogenetic explanation -- that the policy choices of Norwe-
gian, Danish and British regimes were simply a result of those regimes being Norwegian, Danish 
or British, respectively, are not overly generalizable, nor do they provide insight into processes 
that might be expected from regimes in other parts of the world. 
Correlje and Odell (2000) also focus on a single case study (the Netherlands), but then 
narrow their focus further to explore natural gas exploitation.  Their particular interest is in the 
political and economic aspects of the high speed with which the Dutch Groningen natural gas 
field was exploited, and the long-term production period it has experienced over forty years.  
Their explanation for the speed with which the Dutch government developed the Groningen field 
is two-fold.  First, the Groningen gas field was, by industry standards, easy to exploit, particular-
ly since the field is essentially coastal.  Second, the Dutch government set itself up as the single 
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consumer of the raw product by establishing a joint venture in Gasunie, the natural gas pipeline 
firm. Gasunie had right of first refusal of all gas produced, allowing effective government control 
over production sales without direct ownership of the means of production.  Additionally, be-
cause Gasunie had the right of first refusal, it was able to communicate the demands of Dutch 
industry for more and faster gas exploitation in the face of the first oil crisis of 1973-1974.  Gas 
produced in Dutch waters never made it to non-Dutch markets: it was overwhelmingly bought by 
Gasunie.   
The reasoning for the monopsonistic policies of the Dutch is found elsewhere in the liter-
ature:  Ion, (1977, in Mangonne, Ed.), discusses the problems related to ownership of the Dutch 
resources.  There were initial challenges by the (then West) Germans, who sought the resources 
for themselves.  Cowhey (1985) demonstrates that the Dutch sought to control not only the rate 
at which they exploited their natural gas finds (fast) but the destinations of their natural gas sales 
(preferably not Germany).   
Eckbo (1979) implicitly makes plain why this category of literature focuses on either oil 
or gas.  Oil and gas are seen by economists as substitute.  This means that when the price of oil 
goes up, the demand for gas shifts outwards, and vice versa.  This single-product literature as-
sumes that what it finds for one product implies that the other product has results that can be de-
rived by using the laws of substitution from economics.   
The problem with Eckbo’s assumption is that the products are not perfect substitutes. 
States cannot easily switch their infrastructure over to gas from oil when the price goes up.  
There have to be separate infrastructures for each product, and the capacity of the infrastructures 
is not likely to be the same.   Building redundant capacities is not efficient for the market, and it 
would not be likely to find either political or shareholder favor.  Markets adjust to this lack of 
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perfect substitutability with relatively quick price adjustments: political institutions, on the other 
hand, cannot adapt so quickly.  Further, by focusing on one product, the literature implies that 
the lessons of the substituting product are not significant or inherently valuable to the policy 
maker.  The history of the institutions in question does not bear out that implication. 
This single product focus problem is compounded in the second category of literature, fo-
cused on case studies such as Britain or Norway.  G.A. MacKay and D.I. MacKay (1975), for 
example, seek to project and explain the economic impact of the UK's early push for fast exploi-
tation of North Sea oil  They describe a Keynsian multiplier effect: that the rise in income in one 
segment of the participants in the economy will produce an increase in the demand for goods and 
services produced in other portions of the economy (MacKay and MacKay, 1975, pp. 162-163).  
They distinguish between the effects direct and indirect effects of oil, particularly for Scotland, 
and then follow modernization theory.  Their concluding proposal is that the increased Scottish 
per capita income and employment would lead to calls for Scottish independence and devolution 
of the union of the United Kingdom. 
The work of MacKay & MacKay (1975) is echoed in the work G.A. MacKay did with T. 
Lind in 1979, exploring the oil policies of Norway.  MacKay and Lind's major finding is unit 
heterogenetic: Norway's oil policies are a result of Norway's unique political, economic and in-
dustrial conditions.  Particularly, they argue that Norway did not need the oil it found in the 
North Sea: its non-transportation energy requirements were met by the production of hydroelec-
tric power.  Because of this, MacKay and Lind conclude that Norway was able to focus on reve-
nue maximization for the state, forming Statoil and ensuring the state owned enterprise had a 
significant to majority share in each and all exploration and extraction efforts. As also pointed 
out by Bromley (1991), a significant source of Norway's ability to carry out such a policy was 
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the lack of a balance of payments constraint, such as that faced by Britain. 
There is also comparative literature that incorporates both Britain and Norway, primarily 
examining whether the state-focused or market focused approach is more optimal for the eco-
nomic and political requirements of the state in question.  Bromley (1991), for example, outlines 
the British approach to managing its resource windfalls.  Britain, in essence, sought to use its 
windfall to address balance of payments constraints (Bromley, 1991). To get the money from 
extraction quickly, it invited foreign direct investment by American companies, and minimized 
involvement of the state by either privatizing or not building state owned enterprises that partici-
pated in production.  He compares this to Norway, which took a much more state-centered, 
planned, go-slow development approach.  Bromley explains this by characterizing the Norwe-
gians as seeking to minimize the likelihood of an outbreak of Dutch disease, overwhelming the 
Norwegian economy and industry. 
While unit heterogeneity is a common and even valuable explanation for policy choices, 
it leaves out two important elements.  First, the resources of the North Sea are shared: the deci-
sions made by one country will impact the decisions made by another. This is not only because 
the resources are non-renewable, but also because decisions made by one country will impact 
expectations of the market and market actors, such as product companies.  Second, single case 
studies minimize an element of learning.  By focusing on single case studies, the analysts make 
the implication that the experiences of one state (Norway, for example), are not significant or 
useful to the decisions of another (e.g. Britain). 
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3.     VARIABLES 
3.1 Dependent Variable: Level of Privatization 
The dependent variable this work seeks to explain is the set of policy choices made by the 
institution-formulating regime.  These policy choices determine the kind of and level of state 
participation in the production process.  There are two kinds of production processes in question: 
offshore production of oil, and offshore production of natural gas. 
In oil, the production process is one of extraction. Using offshore oil rigs and derricks, oil 
is extracted from the seabed. Crude oil is a thick, viscous liquid that does not change its volatility 
significantly: once extracted, it is just as flammable as it is before extraction. Because of this, oil 
can be transported through a variety of means, including rail, truck, ship or pipeline. For offshore 
oil production, the production process ends when the oil enters its means of transportation: either 
a pipeline, or a ship. 
 Natural gas is a more complicated product than oil is. Natural gas is much more volatile 
once extracted than it is prior to extraction. During the extraction process, natural gas can only be 
transported through a pipeline.
 1
 Because the product's transportation is limited to pipelines, natu-
ral gas has to get to shore before it can be routed to its end-user. Because of this, the extraction 
process of natural gas does not end until the natural gas reaches the terminus, where it can enter a 
variety of pipeline systems.   
The states designing institutions in the presence of windfalls, then, must choose some 
level of private participation and state participation in the production process. This process can 
range from wholly public, in which the state completely controls process by which oil or gas is 
                                                          
1
 Liquefied natural gas requires that the product be landed and refined before the product can be loaded on to tankers 
or trucks. As a consequence, LNG is not considered as part of this work: it is a post-extraction process.  
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produced, to wholly private, in which the state, having leased out its resources, does not partici-
pate in the production process at all.  Most states, including the Netherlands, the UK and Nor-
way, choose some level of privatization between the two ends of the spectrum.  In the case of the 
United Kingdom, the emphasis was on the market. In the case of the Netherlands, there was a 
combination of market and state actors.  In the case of Norway, the state was a direct actor in all 
extraction measures. 
3.2 Independent Variables: Regime Type, International Prices, and Domestic De-
mand 
The degree of private operation of production is determined by three independent var-
iables. The first is the preferences of the government in power.  These are largely set 
by the ideological orientation of the party in government.  The second variable is the 
international prices that can be gotten abroad for the institution-designing state’s 
product.  
Third is the domestic demand for the product.  These three variables are additive, resulting in 
institutions that are not wholly determined by any one of the independent variables. 
 
3.2.1 Regime Preferences: A Spectrum of Institutional Design and Implementation 
In the construction of institutions of any sort, the state building the institution has a spec-
trum of options with three major nuclei.  At either end of the spectrum are options for a state fo-
cused institution or a market focused institution.  Between the two extremes, a third option is an 
institution that combines the elements of state and market focus.   
At one end of the spectrum, a wholly state focused institution leaves private actors out of 
the extraction process.  The resource is nationalized and production is nationalized.  The market's 
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first entry into the transactional process is when the product comes to a market outside of the 
state.  The best example of a wholly state focused solution would be found in the USSR, where 
state owned enterprises were wholly in control of the production process until product arrived on 
the global market (such as the state owned natural gas enterprise Gazprom, and the natural gas 
transportation across the USSR owned Druzhba pipeline to western Europe).   
At the other end of the spectrum, a market focused institution, at its extreme, would iden-
tify the resource in question as wholly belonging to some non-state party.  The resource is pri-
vate and production is private.  Prices and quantities supplied would be wholly a function of the 
market at the time of production and the expectations about the future state of the market for the 
commodity.  The state's role in the process would be limited to one of taxation, either at the point 
of sale, at the point of reports of corporate income, or at some other transactional point defined 
by the state's taxing authority.  The best examples of such a solution is found in 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century America, particularly around the mining of gold and the early oil industry. 
Finally, an institution combining state focus and market focus might be implemented.  
Such an institution might allow for state ownership and some role for the state in production, but 
would also allow non-state, market actors to participate relatively fully in the production process.  
It is such a combination that is in effect in almost every commodity market in the world.  From 
case to case, only the relative weights of market participation and state participation that vary. 
What is puzzling, then, is how Norway, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, three 
relatively similar states, reacted so differently to their North Sea windfalls.  It is reasonable to 
expect that similar states would have similar reactions in terms of the weight of state focus and 
market focus in institutional design responding to windfalls.  In the case of the North Sea, how-
ever, the three cases' responses are notably different.  
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Explanations for these choices might be found in the preferences of the state, which logi-
cally, should be a function of the state's past experience with managing either (a) resources or (b) 
windfalls, and also of the policy preferences of the designing regime. A more conservative, right-
leaning government, for example, could be expected to design an institution with a stronger mar-
ket focus than state focus, and vice versa.  These preferences, however, are also influenced by 
the international conditions surrounding the onset of the windfall which cannot be ignored.  
Those conditions shape and form the institutions that will govern the windfall.  The independent 
variable for regime preferences, then, follows the political position of the government in power.  
For this work, the preferences of governments are divided into two broad groups:  interventionist 
(left-leaning) and laissez-faire (right-leaning).  
Government Orientation Hypothesis a: a more laissez-faire government will favor an en-
ergy-extraction institution that gives private industry more weight in the production process than 
the state. Such an institution is likely to be partially or wholly privatized. 
Government Orientation Hypothesis b: a more interventionist government will favor an 
energy-extraction institution that gives the state more weight in the production process than pri-
vate industry.  Such an institution is likely to strongly favor a state-owned enterprise. 
This hypothesis seeks to answer the question 'what effect do regimes' preferences have on 
the policy choices regimes make governing windfall extraction?'  If the government is left-
leaning and favors market intervention, then the policy choices should show more state focus.  
On the other hand, a right-leaning government should make policy choices that are more market 
focused.   
Regardless of whether the governments are market or state focused, in this hypothesis, 
the initial conditions surrounding the discovery of the windfall are not as important an influence 
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on the construction of the extraction-governing institutions than the government’s preferences 
are.  This is seen in the preference of the Netherlands and the UK for fast extraction.  The UK 
needed the energy quickly for its industry and the revenue to address balance of payments con-
straints (an issue of significant concern to the regime at the time).  The Netherlands was con-
vinced that if it did not extract the gas quickly, then the advent of cheap nuclear power would 
make its newly found natural gas reserves worthless.  This is also seen in the preference of Nor-
way for slow and revenue maximizing energy institutions.  Norwegian industry did not immedi-
ately require the energy, whereas the long term revenues would never be unwelcome. 
3.2.2 Initial Conditions: International Prices and Domestic Demand 
The term 'initial conditions' is well understood in conventional economics, however, it 
gets muddied when dealing with institutional political economy.  In terms of this work, 'initial 
conditions' refer to the economic circumstances that are in play in the global market. While ini-
tial conditions have impact on the economic circumstances internal to the state discovering the 
windfall, they are mostly external to the state. States are singular players. The initial conditions 
of the global economy are a function of the aggregated economies of the aggregated states of the 
world.  Because the global economy has so many participants, even at the nation-state level, a 
single state is not able to exert deterministic power over the economy at any given time. When a 
resource discovery is made, the discovering state is subject to the decisions it has already made, 
and that all the other economies have made in the global market.  In the context of resource dis-
coveries, the only way a state can set the initial conditions it will face when it discovers its wind-
fall is if it possesses perfect foresight (excluded as an option given the cases).    
The particular initial conditions faced by these states are narrowed as follows:  global 
demand for the windfall good (operationalized as the international price of the windfall good), 
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extraction costs, and the internal initial condition defined by domestic industrial need for the 
windfall good (operationalized by the quantity of energy products used by the country in terms 
of million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE))
2
. The most significant of these conditions are price 
and internal need, and are identified as international prices (IP) and domestic demand (DD).   
The initial conditions’ impacts on policy formulation are additive.  No state faces high 
domestic demand in isolation from either high or low international prices or from right-leaning 
or interventionist governments.  As a consequence, the definitions and impacts of the variables 
are spelled out, but hypotheses are only tested for the additive situations. 
These variables are termed initial conditions, rather than economic conditions, because 
their levels are set prior to the discovery of the windfall.  Governments attempt to control eco-
nomic conditions as part of their mandate: they set targets for inflation, unemployment, GDP 
growth, export growth, trade deficits and other economic variables.  They cannot, however, 
change conditions in the present that are a result of either past market conditions or past policy 
positions levels, unless the windfall discovered happens to also be a time machine.   
3.2.2.1 Initial Conditions: International Prices 
Under high international prices, all states are resource-rent maximizers. Some states max-
imize directly (by extracting and selling the resource directly), some maximize indirectly (by tax-
ing the resource extractors).  High international prices offer states opportunities to grab revenues 
while they can: they did not have the revenues prior to the windfall, and market volatility means 
they may not have them tomorrow.     
There is little potential downside to the state entering production directly when interna-
tional prices are high. High international prices provide an opportunity for states to generate rev-
                                                          
2
 This allows for the comparison of products: coal usage vs. natural gas usage vs. oil usage vs. hydroelectric. 
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enues from foreign entities – corporations and citizens who buy the product from the state (and 
who, being foreign, cannot retaliate against the government at the ballot box).   
States enter production directly under high international prices for two additional reasons. 
First, direct extraction allows the state to minimize revenue collection costs:  by extracting the 
product and selling it directly, the government avoids potential tax evasion by extractors.  Sec-
ond, by directly producing, states have the opportunity to fully internalize rents generated by the 
resource: if they rely on an indirect method, significant portions of the rents are lost to the private 
actors.  To accomplish a similar level of internalization would require that states set a taxation 
level so high that private actors could not be induced to develop the windfall resource.
3
 
Low international prices, on the other hand, do not offer states immediate revenue possi-
bilities.  In fact, they offer states just the opposite. In the presence of low international prices, 
any move the state makes toward getting involved in extraction of the resource will only be cost-
ly to the state. The state will have to use resources to formulate its own engagement policy, or to 
encourage private actors to enter the market: using resources carries costs, which, with low inter-
national prices, will be harder to (if not impossible to) recoup.  Because the potential revenues 
are so much lower, there is no motive for the state to get involved, directly or indirectly, in ex-
traction.  Indeed, if prices are too low, then it is likely that the resource will not be developed at 
all by either private or public actors. Absent a resource-rent motive, the state spending resources 
on developing extraction rules is irrational.   
International Prices Hypothesis a: when prices are high, the government’s level of pri-
vatization in extraction is lower than when prices are low. 
                                                          
3 Examples of such evasion are myriad, and not limited to energy. They include the evasion of resource taxes in 
post-Soviet Russian energy ventures and the evasion of taxes on hardwood harvesting in the Solomon Islands (Dau-
vergne, 1998) and Brazil (Bannerjee et al, 2009). 
18 
International Prices Hypothesis b: when prices are low, the government’s level of privat-
ization in extraction is higher than when prices are high. 
3.2.2.2 Initial Conditions: Domestic Demand 
If domestic demand for the product is high at time of discovery, the regime's policies will 
push for private development of the resource.  The reasoning behind this is somewhat counter-
intuitive until fully explored.  As with high international prices, when domestic demand is high, 
governments are presented with a revenue motive.  In the international price variable, resource 
rents come from abroad when international prices are high.  When domestic demand is high, the 
resource rents are domestically generated.  When prices in the international market are high, 
governments with resources within their sovereign territory can 'tax' foreigners by selling them 
their valuable products.   
On the other hand, ceteris paribus, when domestic demand for those products is high, the 
revenues that governments can generate from the resource come from their own constituents.      
Governments prefer to generate revenues in such a manner that minimizes the burden on their 
citizens: it increases the likelihood of their re-election (which is, per Downs, 1957, the dominant 
preference of any government).  When the public has a high level of demand for a resource, the 
burden on the public imposed by high government involvement in the extraction of the resource 
is also high. Domestic users of the resource product are trapped by the path of industrial devel-
opment followed in the past. Absent technological methods that allow the users to switch to the 
cheapest resource at will, a domestic user of energy resources must use the resource their equip-
ment is designed for.  As a consequence, regardless of the price of the product, users are forced 
to consume roughly the same amount of product, spending more per unit of production, or to cut 
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production to keep their costs the same (which reduces their revenues, while not reducing their 
costs). 
High domestic demand for product, then, creates political pressure to keep product prices 
low. The drive to be re-elected, then, pushes governments to select a level of privatization that 
allows the market actors to dominate extraction.  There are two major reasons for this.  First, 
when market actors dominate the extraction regime, governments can satisfy their rent-seeking 
interests by taxing the extractors.  Second, with low levels of privatization, the state-owned ex-
tractor will face considerable political pressure to sell product at prices that neither meet opera-
tional costs nor satisfy the rent-seeking preferences of the government.  No matter how low the 
prices are, the voters would prefer the prices to be still lower
4
.  Any price that a state-owned ex-
tractor of resources charges to domestic consumers will be too high and will create a retaliation 
motive against the government that runs the state-owned enterprise.  Since governments prefer to 
re-election over all other options, they will seek to avoid creating reasons for constituents to vote 
for their opponents. 
If, on the other hand, the government allows private actors to dominate extraction, then 
the blame for domestic product prices falls on the corporations doing the extraction and selling.  
The corporate revenues can be taxed at a level set and controlled by the government granting the 
extractors access to the resources. The dominant preference for re-election is met (voters blame 
companies, not the governments granting the companies the extraction license), and the revenue-
generation preference is satisfied (corporations' abilities to retaliate against governments at the 
ballot box is limited).  
                                                          
4
 This is why, even when world prices are low, if domestic demand is high, the government controlling the new-
found resource will prefer to push the burden of high payments on to the shoulders of corporations.  When demand 
is high, the quantity consumed outweighs any potential benefit that could be gained from low prices. A prime exam-
ple of this is found in Brazil, where charcoal is the dominant product demanded for fuel, but the government leaves 
harvesting of wood for charcoal production to private actors (Bannerjee, ibid). 
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The counterparts to the international prices hypotheses, then, are the domestic demand 
hypotheses. 
Domestic Demand Hypothesis a: when domestic demand for a resource is high, ceteris 
paribus, governments will have higher levels of privatization in the extraction process. 
Domestic Demand Hypothesis b: when domestic demand for a resource is low, ceteris paribus, 
governments will have lower levels of privatization in the extraction process. 
3.3 Additive Variables: the Simultaneous Impact of Regime Preferences, Interna-
tional Prices, and Domestic Demand 
Government orientation, international prices, and domestic demand are additive in impact 
on the level of privatization selected by the government. A laissez-faire  government facing high 
international prices and high demand will cushion the potential for retaliation by voters that can 
be provoked by overly high government involvement with the high rents governments can seek 
by selling the product abroad.  The result is a high point of privatization.   
An interventionist  government facing high prices and high domestic demand, on the oth-
er hand, will dominate the extraction role in order to rent-seek from abroad. The level of privati-
zation is, however lower than the optimal level for staving off voter retribution.  Voters (and 
therefore governments courting re-election by those voters) prefer higher quantities of product to 
lower quantities, and lower prices to higher: higher quantities and lower prices are most easily 
accomplished when the market is able to run without state owned enterprises’ participation.   
The laissez-faire government’s preference for extraction by private actors continues to 
dominate the institution when prices and domestic demand are low.  Under low international 
prices, governments would prefer to leave extraction in the hands of market actors, ceteris pari-
bus.  This saves the government costly development projects that may not pay for themselves.   
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The interventionist government, on the other hand, takes advantage of the windfall to ac-
complish political goals, such as improving domestic employment levels. Even when interna-
tional prices are low, an interventionist government can use the moderate rents generated to pay 
for expanded employment opportunities in the new state owned product-extracting enterprise.  
Further, low international prices can give the interventionist government a reason to include pri-
vate industry as a participant in a joint venture to cushion the expensive exploration costs.  Under 
such conditions, the interventionist government can structure joint-venture agreements in such a 
way that the political aims of the government are met. 
When domestic demand is low, however, both interventionist and laissez-faire govern-
ments prefer higher levels of participation than they do when demand is high.  When domestic 
demand is low, the quantity of product used and the number of users is not so big that the gov-
ernment’s participation in extraction would provoke a meaningful number of voters to retaliate at 
the ballot box.  The voters would be unhappy – but there would not be enough unhappy voters 
for the government to worry about its re-election chances.   
As a result, when prices and demand are low, the level of privatization is moderate, be-
tween the two points. For a laissez-faire government, this will be a high-moderate privatization 
level, still favoring the market over the state.  For the interventionist government, this will be a 
low-moderate privatization level, favoring the state over the market. 
Low prices combined with high demand produces consistently high privatization levels. 
Both laissez-faire and interventionist governments have no international rent motive to enter into 
extraction.  Further, they have a ballot box disincentive deterring them from entering extraction 
at home.  The result is a high level of privatization.  The interventionist government is likely to 
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engage in some token level of exploration and production, but will allow the market to dominate 
the institution.   
Likewise, high prices paired with low demand result in low levels of privatization: lais-
sez-faire and interventionist governments have significant rent motives to enter into production 
internationally, and the domestic deterrent to entering production is not big enough to keep gov-
ernment from trying to maximize revenues.  In an interventionist regime, the likely result is a 
wholly state-owned enterprise.  Even a laissez-faire government will dominate the institution, 
but still allow private market actors to have some role in extraction. 
The result of the additive impact of the variables are the hypotheses that will be tested 
here: 
Additive variable hypothesis 1: high prices combined with high demand result in moder-
ate levels of privatization with regime preferences dominating the degree of moderation. 
Additive variable hypothesis 2: low prices combined with low demand result in moderate 
levels of privatization with regime preferences dominating the degree of moderation. 
Additive variable hypothesis 3: low prices combined with high demand result in high lev-
els of privatization, even in interventionist governments. 
Additive variable hypothesis 4: High prices combined with low demand result in low lev-
els of privatization even in laissez-faire governments. 
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Table 1: Potential outcomes from price / demand combinations 
 
Regime 
Type 
Level of 
Privatiza-
tion 
Interna-
tional 
Prices 
Level of 
Privatiza-
tion 
Domestic 
Demand 
Level of 
Privatiza-
tion 
Additive Level 
of Privatization 
 
Laissez-faire High (+) High Low (-) High High (+) 
High-Moderate 
(+-+) 
Laissez-faire High (+) Low High (+) Low Low (-) 
High-Moderate 
(++-) 
Laissez-faire High (+) Low High (+) High High (+) 
High  
(+++) 
Laissez-faire High (+) High Low (-) Low Low (-) 
Low-Moderate 
(+--) 
Interventionist Low (-) High Low (-) High High (+) 
Low-Moderate 
(--+) 
Interventionist Low (-) Low High (+) Low Low (-) 
Low-Moderate  
(-+-) 
Interventionist Low (-) Low High (+) High High (+) 
High-Moderate 
(-++) 
Interventionist Low (-) High Low (-) Low Low (-) 
Low  
(---) 
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4     METHODOLOGY 
This work will follow a mixed method approach of most similar systems design and 
structured, focused comparison. Most similar systems research design (MSSD) is a method by 
which as many extraneous differences among the data sources are eliminated.  This creates a sit-
uation of a natural experiment: the variation is limited to the variables of interest.  One of the of-
ten-cited problems with using MSSD is that it is rare to find a set of cases that qualify for a strict 
utilization  of the MSSD criteria.  Ljiphart characterizes this as the "[too] many variables, small 
number of cases" (Ljiphart, 1971, p. 685) problem.   
This can be addressed by relaxing some of the MSSD requirements. Rather than requiring 
identical characteristics in all but the dependent variable, in applying a relaxed MSSD project the 
researcher chooses "to study countries that appear to be similar in as many background charac-
teristics as possible, but where the researcher never systematically matches the cases on all the 
relevant control variables" (Anckar, 2008, p. 390).  This is the approach taken here. 
  Having selected three most similar states, this study will follow George and Ben-
nett (2005), using a method of structured, focused comparision.  This process is as follows: 
1. Structured: particular research questions are asked of each case study (Structured) 
2. Focused: the study “…deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases exam-
ined” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 67) 
3. Comparison: The answers to step one are compared across cases. 
In this particular work, the questions would be as follows:  
1. What were the regime preferences at the time of discovery? 
2. What were the international product prices at time of discovery? 
3. What was the domestic demand for product at the time of discovery? 
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The particular aspects dealt with by this study are governing regime characteristics, inter-
national prices, and domestic demand at the time of the discovery. 
As this is a qualitative work, the comparison will be largely one of historical analysis and 
process tracing. Evidence supporting hypothesis or another would lie in the repetition of institu-
tional elements or introduction of new elements.  For example, the Norwegian's role of Statoil, as 
opposed to having fixed tax rates, would indicate that the government’s drive for rents from the 
international markets were more dominant in institutional design than the domestic demand for 
the product.  The particular methodology will focus on direct comparison. Looking at the institu-
tional features and design processes should indicate strength of the independent variables – in-
ternational prices and domestic demand. 
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5. CASE STUDIES: THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND 
NORWAY 
5.1 The Netherlands 
5.1.1 Initial Conditions: International Prices and Domestic Demand 
The Groningen field of natural gas was discovered in 1959.  The Netherlands was fortu-
nate in that unlike the United Kingdom and Norway, the Dutch natural gas reserves were both 
shallow and close to shore.  This would offset some of the extraction issues associated with the 
product.  Natural gas is volatile and difficult to move. Unlike oil, which can be transported in 
trucks and ships, gas requires specialized infrastructure, pipelines, to be brought to market. As a 
consequence, the production of natural gas is not simply a matter of extracting the gas from the 
seabed, but also of moving it through pipelines to the utilization point.  Natural gas pipelines 
were already in use in the Netherlands, however a new set demanded to be built to land the gas at 
Rotterdam and bring the product into the national gas transportation network. These pipelines 
took four years to complete, and came online in 1963.   
As described earlier, the Dutch government allowed Royal Dutch Shell to form a joint 
venture with Esso, called Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), and granted NAM a mo-
nopoly on the extraction of gas from the seabed.
 5
 Once extracted, however, a joint venture be-
tween the Dutch government and Royal Dutch Shell, Gasunie, had the first rights to purchase of 
the gas for their pipelines – including those pipelines that transported the gas from the wellhead 
to the shore.  In essence, the monopoly extractors only owned the gas as far as the sea floor: then 
                                                          
5
 The records of these negotiations (if any) remain unavailable for examination. 
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they had to sell it to the joint venture that was half-owned by the government. The Dutch gas ex-
traction process was three quarters private, one quarter state owned enterprise.  
 
Figure 1: Dutch Gas Extraction Ownership 
 
Between 1959 and 1963, the Dutch government set up the guidelines by which the gas 
would be extracted and transported.  These guidelines were set through a series of confidential 
negotiations between the companies that procured the gas from the seabed and the government, 
eventually allocating a near monopoly to Royal Dutch Shell, which formed a joint venture with 
Esso (now ExxonMobil), called Nederlandse Aardole Maatschappij (NAM). The Dutch govern-
ment, in turn, formed a joint venture with Royal Dutch Shell, Gasunie, to build pipelines through 
which the gas would move from the seabed to the terminus in Rotterdam.  Gasunie operated as a 
monopsony: any natural gas extracted had to be offered to it first for purchase, and only gas 
owned by Gasunie was allowed to move through Gasunie's pipelines.  
When setting up the explicit monopoly of NAM and Gasunie, the Dutch government also set a 
very high tax rate: approximately 70% of the profits went straight into the Dutch government 
coffers. Further, because the demands of Dutch energy were met by municipal utilities, the 
Dutch government was in a position to regulate the prices at which Gasunie could sell its product 
50% 
25% 
25% 
NAM
Gasunie -
Royal Dutch
Shell
Gasunie -
Dutch
Government
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to the three classes of users: industry, households, and generation.  The government would take 
the opportunity of its windfall to push prices quite low and thus increase sales volume exponen-
tially over the first 10 years of the Groningen pipeline's operation. The Dutch had already estab-
lished, in essence, a state-owned energy supplier.  What its preference was was to leave this par-
ticular institution alone -- and adapt the institution of the State (Coal) mines for the governance 
of production, and build a new institution, Gasunie, a 50/50 split between the state and private 
transporters.  This control over the natural gas extraction from underground to the seabed in the 
hands of market actors, but every natural gas transaction thereafter dominated by the state, which 
owned half the transportation system – and took 70% of the profits from both the other half of 
the transportation system and the extraction system. This sets the balance of power in the hands 
of government: 25% controlled outright, and 35% by taxation, for a domination of 60% of the 
institution. 
5.1.2 The Netherlands: Preferences and Regime Type 
Table 2: Dutch Institutional Design Options 
 
Regime 
Type 
Initial Conditions 
(global) 
Initial Conditions 
(domestic) 
Predicted State / 
MarketWeight 
Laissez-Faire Low Price Low Demand M > S 
Laissez-Faire Low Price High Demand M > S 
Laissez-Faire High price Low Demand M > S 
Interventionist High Price High Demand S > M 
Interventionist Low Price Low Demand S > M 
Interventionist Low Price High Demand S > M 
Interventionist High Price Low Demand S > M 
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Between 1959 and the present, Dutch governments have been mostly formed by centrist 
or center-left parties, occasionally shifting further left when the Labor party is in power (as it 
was at the time of the discovery).  These have leaned toward more interventionist positions when 
run by labor and more laissez-faire  when Christian democrat or centrist.  Prices were relatively 
high: the demand for natural gas within Europe was relatively high, and the lesson taken away 
from the Suez crisis was that securing cheap oil was important -- not that finding non-coal or 
non-oil energy sources was critical.     
In the Netherlands, the demand was relatively low: the economy was largely agricultural 
and labor intensive, not industry intensive.  The expected outcome, then, should be that the insti-
tutional design should favor a stronger market role in the extraction process than government 
role.  The case of the Netherlands demonstrates that the perceptions of and preferences about the 
product -- and about the use of the state's revenues -- are particularly significant in resource ex-
traction regime design. 
Between 1948 and 1970, the Dutch government was notably left leaning.  Between 1948 
and 1958, the Dutch Labor party (Social Democrats) was in power. They were followed by the 
Catholic People's Party, a Christian democrat, center-left party, in power until 1966, then return-
ing in 1967. The intervening government was also Christian democrat, the Anti-Revolutionary 
party. The governments of the lowlands have stayed in this alignment to the present time. 
These left-centrist regimes reflected the general historic preferences of the Netherlands.  
In the 1950s, the Dutch economy was significantly reliant on an agricultural base.  Labor tended 
to be cheap, so after WWII, industry was beginning to relocate into the country.  This was damp-
ened by the natural disaster of the 1953 floods and the resultant necessity of the Rine / Maas Del-
ta Scheme -- a massive construction project of flood control by dikes, dams and levies that was 
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funded by the government (and thus the taxpayer).  Interest rates and population growth rates 
were high:  as a consequence, there was significant enthusiasm for the development of the Com-
mon Market.  The Common Market would provide opportunities for the Dutch farmers to sell 
their products at reduced or eliminated tariff rates among member states, would increase the 
number of consumers demanding goods from the NL, and generally expand the production pos-
sibility frontier for the entire country. 
The immediate preferences for the state in terms of state / market relationships about the 
natural gas in Groningen, then, were formed by the Tinbergen plan formulated in the Central 
Plan Bureau.  This plan called for the prioritization of national welfare: improving employment 
figures, increasing the presence of and role of industry in the economy, reducing real interest 
rates, and increasing the size of the social safety net the government could make available to the 
citizens  (Odell 2002, 307-310).  This would lead the analyst to expect an institution dominated 
by the state.  
Groningen, in essence, would be able to accomplish several goals: 
1. it would free up Dutch resources from having to acquire fossil fuel resources from 
abroad 
2. the sale of natural gas would be able to relieve the financial burden on the govern-
ment for building the Delta Scheme 
3. its exploitation would increase the attractiveness of the NL to relocating industry. 
 
Energy in the Netherlands was largely sold by "...municipal or provincial owned utilities, 
which, given the Netherlands’ system of national control over local purse strings, could also be 
considered as quasi-state operations" (Odell, 2002, p. 308).  The state had recently formulated an 
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approach to economic and social management that would promote a welfare optimization strate-
gy.  This was a new approach for the state: in the past, the Dutch government had been much 
more laissez-faire in its approach to economic regulation.  When setting up the explicit monopo-
ly of NAM and Gasunie, the Dutch government also set a very high tax rate: approximately 70% 
of the profits went straight into the Dutch government coffers. Further, because the demands of 
Dutch energy were met by municipal utilities, the Dutch government was in a position to regu-
late the prices at which Gasunie could sell its product to the three classes of users: industry, 
households, and generation.  The government would take the opportunity of its windfall to push 
prices quite low and thus increase sales volume exponentially over the first 10 years of the Gro-
ningen pipeline's operation. The Dutch had already established, in essence, a state-owned energy 
supplier.   
The government’s preference was to leave this particular institution alone -- and adapt the 
institution of the State (Coal) mines for the governance of production, and build a new institu-
tion, Gasunie, a 50/50 split between the state and private transporters.  The state, then, only di-
rectly controlled 25% of the natural gas extraction process: the majority of the control of extrac-
tion was in the hands of market actors. On the surface, this would refute government orientation 
hypothesis, as well as additive hypothesis 4.  
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5.1.3 The Netherlands: Initial Conditions – International Prices 
Table 3: Prices of Dutch Natural Gas 
 
Year 
Price per 
1000 m
3 
(Nominal 
Dutch guil-
ders) 
Price per 
1000 m
3
 
($2008)
**
 
1962
*
 150 263.71 
1963
*
 130 224.29 
1964 80 136.63 
1965 58 97.34 
1966 58 94.40 
1967 58 92.16 
1968 28 42.66 
1969 43 62.44 
  
*
 Pipeline not completed and delivering gas until 1963. 
  ** 
Conversions of currency to real, 2008 US dollars by author 
(Source: Odell, 2002 & personal communications; IEA & OECD, 1998) 
 
As seen from Table 3, at the time of discovery, natural gas prices were relatively high 
abroad but were, in real terms, falling.  By and large, the international demand for natural gas in 
Europe was relatively low in this period: most states relied on coal for their energy demands.  
Gas is a more efficient mechanism for producing energy, and the Dutch government could rea-
sonably expect international demand to stabilize at a favorable rate.  Indeed, Odell (2002) shows 
that there were significant concerns on the part of the Dutch government about potential pressure 
from West Germany to demand sales.  These high international prices should lead the Dutch 
governments to favor lower levels of privatization. 
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5.1.4 The Netherlands: Initial Conditions - Domestic Demand 
 
In 1963, the Dutch were not using a lot of natural gas to power their cities or industries: 
only about 3% of its total energy use (Oil & Gas Journal, 1970). The overwhelming power 
source was coal, biomass, or wind (Odell, 2002).  To encourage the use of natural gas, the Dutch 
government, exercising its monopoly on sovereignty, dictated to Gasunie that the price of natural 
gas for domestic consumption would be reduced, and reduced dramatically, to 5.8 Dutch cents 
(d.c.) per therm in 1965. In that year, 97.9% of Gasunie's product was sold within the Nether-
lands: by 1969, that figure dropped to 65.2%.  The Netherlands bought 500.3 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas ( 500.3 bn x .0283 m
3
) at the newly set price of 4.6 d.c. per m
3
:  Gasunie paid 3.66 
d.c. per m
3
 to the producers -- and the Dutch government took 70% of that.  And during this pe-
riod ('63-'69), the Netherlands went from getting 3% to 25% of its energy from natural gas. 
(Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics). 
At the outset, then, the only way for the Dutch government to generate the significant 
revenues it demanded from its windfall to fund the sea wall project would be to drastically in-
crease the quantity of natural gas sold.  Within the Netherlands, demand was low: by utilizing a 
variety of subsidies and incentives to encourage energy producers and end-users (such as house-
holds) to shift their product preference to natural gas, the Dutch government increased the de-
mand for the product. One of those incentives was to force the price of natural gas down.  The 
government was able to accomplish this because the production firms were monopolistic joint 
ventures between Shell-Esso and the Dutch government, and the transportation firm, Gasunie, 
was a monopsonistic private-public partnership. As the dominant partner in these arrangements, 
the government was able to unilaterally set the prices at a point that would maximize the quantity 
of gas sold, and thus maximize the revenues that could accrue to the state.  The low domestic 
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demand, then, should lead the state to favor higher levels of state dominance.  The interventionist 
Dutch government, however, only directly owned 25% of the process: not a high level of state 
dominance.  
It is at this point that examination of the transactions involved with extraction shows the 
effective level of control and accrual of profit in the Netherlands.  75% of the natural gas extrac-
tion process was in the hands of market actors, and 100% of the process of bringing the gas to 
the seabed in the hands of market actors.  However, from a financial perspective, the state domi-
nated every transaction involved with natural gas from the time the gas got to the seabed to the 
time it got to utilization.  Not only did the Dutch government own half the transportation system 
– including the pipelines that brought the natural gas from the seabed to the shore and distribu-
tion points, but the government set a 70% tax rate on profits for every natural gas transaction – 
including extraction from the seabed. This meant the government controlled 70% of the profits 
from the other half of the transportation system (35% of the process overall), 70% of the extrac-
tion system (another 17.5% of the process overall), and directly owned 25% of the transporta-
tion.  This sets the balance of power in the hands of government: 25% controlled outright, and 
52.5% by taxation, for a domination of 77.5% of the institution. Figure 2 provides a graphic rep-
resentation of the distribution.  
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Figure 2: End Control of Dutch Gas Profits 
 
The Dutch regime included government participation, and dominated the critical trans-
portation sector of the natural gas extraction process. International prices were high, allowing the 
government to rent-seek from abroad by utilizing its partially-publicly owned pipeline network.  
Domestic demand, however, at the initial design point was low, correlating with the presence of 
government actor in the market.  This leads to the confirmation of additive hypothesis 4: high 
prices combined with low demand results in low levels of privatization, regardless of govern-
ment orientation. 
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5.2 The United Kingdom 
5.2.1 Overview: Institutional Characteristics 
The oil of the North Sea, east of Scotland, was discovered in 1965.  The meteorological 
conditions of the North Sea under the best of circumstances could be called ruthless.  The usual 
conditions are extremely hazardous to human operators as well as to the complex industrial 
structures demanded to extract oil from between 300 (100 m) and 2,300 (700 m) feet below the 
sea surface.  This is then exacerbated by the demand to drill approximately 2500 – 3150 m under 
the seafloor to reach the oil. Unlike natural gas, oil can be transported to shore in tankers, alt-
hough pipelines are more efficient and came online 1975 in the UK’s section of the North Sea, 
well after the initial exploitation rules were set up.    
 Between 1965 and 1966, the British government set up the guidelines by which the oil of 
the North Sea would be extracted.  These rules called for a closed-envelope bidding process to 
obtain leaseholds within a group of blocks made available for auction.  The rules did not explicit-
ly call for drilling to be carried out: a company could take out a leasehold on a block without ac-
tually drilling exploratory wells in it. However, since the auction process was qualitative as well 
as quantitative, a bidding company that did not plan to drill in a block in which it held a lease 
could find that its bid to renew the lease was not accepted. Further, the rules allowed for the Min-
ister of Power (later, the Minister of Technology, and then the Minister of Technology and In-
dustry) to step in and require the company implement an exploration regime of the Minister’s 
devising (Utton, 1968).   
  The primary instrument the British institution relied on for revenue generation was taxa-
tion. There were two tiers of taxation: petroleum revenue tax (PRT) and corporate tax (CT).  
Corporations extracting oil from the North Sea identified what their petroleum revenue was and 
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the amount of CT due the government (Rowland and Hann, 1987). Unlike the Dutch case, in 
which the government granted monopolies for extraction and thus was able to directly tax single 
participants, the British were faced with multiple companies extracting oil from multiple fields. 
The regime granting licenses for exploration was a qualitative auction, where one of the condi-
tions for obtaining a license to explore and extract oil was meeting governmental preferences 
about proposed speed of extraction.  Firms frequently had several fields, and as might be reason-
ably expected, not all fields were equally productive. 
The accounting method in the British extraction institution allowed for exploring and pro-
ducing firms to offset one field’s failure to produce oil against another field’s production. With 
multiple fields, it was frequently the case that the net product that a firm extracted was below the 
total amount of oil exempt from taxation (10.16 million metric tons per year). Given that produc-
tion fell below that amount for the entire UK until 1976, it is hardly surprising that the govern-
ment generated little revenue from the PRT.  The UK was also unable to generate revenue from 
the CT on oil companies.  Oil exploration is expensive: the accounting rules for deduction of ex-
ploration costs from production revenues during this period were such that CT revenues to the 
government were also quite small. Block licenses were cheap: no more than £72,500 per year 
(MacKay and MacKay, 1975). In the first four rounds of licensing, a total of 245 licenses were 
issued, with a maximum total potential rent of £2,662,500 ($45,567,772) per year.  Given the 
cumulative contribution of oil revenues to GDP between 1973 and 1978 of 14,680,000,000 
($38,270,760,000), the government’s share of 0.07255% hardly seemed equitable (Atkinson and 
Hall, 1983 and MacKay and MacKay, 1975, author’s calculations).6 
  
                                                          
6  By comparison, if this had been oil produced in the Dutch portion of the North Sea, the Gov-
ernment’s share of the revenues would have amounted to £10,276,000,000 ($26,789,532,000). 
38 
Table 4: British Institutional Design Options 
 
Regime 
Type 
Initial Conditions 
(global) 
Initial Conditions 
(domestic) 
Predicted State 
/ Market 
Weight 
Interventionist High Price High Demand M ≈ S 
Interventionist High Price Low Demand S > M 
Interventionist Low Price High Demand S > M 
Interventionist Low Price Low Demand S > M 
Laissez-Faire High Price High Demand S > M 
Laissez-Faire Low Price High Demand M ≈ S 
Laissez-Faire Low Price Low Demand M > S 
Laissez-Faire High Price Low Demand M > S 
 
5.2.2 The United Kingdom: Preferences and Regime Type 
Whereas the Dutch focused on commerce, particularly after 1813, the British focused on 
industrialization since the mid 18th century.  The path of British finance, however, was some-
what similar to that of the Dutch.  British firms depended "...heavily on internally generated 
funds and issues of equity for finance" (Hall, 1986, p. 38).  In the case of Britain, however, banks 
and financial institutions emerged tied to regions and industries present in those regions. A sys-
tem of finance and industry that consists of a large number of actors with significant local 
knowledge emerges, from which classic neoliberal ideas about economic behavior and govern-
ance emerge.  The economy industrialized to such a degree that 95% of the labor force in Britain 
was not engaged in agriculture by 1950 (ibid, p. 27).    
The role of the government in this economic system at the time of the formulation of the 
North Sea oil regime was one in which British policy makers "...[embraced] a variant of Keynes-
ianism which suggested that higher levels of investment and employment could be sustained 
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through the management of aggregate demand.  Policy was to be aimed at ... the achievement of 
full employment, and manipulation of fiscal and monetary policy was to be used to attain it" 
(Hall, 1986, p. 50).  Industrial policy would be deployed to try to provoke full employment, 
along with manipulations of monetary and fiscal policy. Where the Dutch saw industrial policy 
as having significant public interest elements that necessitated a stakeholder model, the British 
governments, from 1918 on, largely asked industries to devise processes of reorganization and 
reallocation of resources  
British governments took a hands-off approach to the industries of the country.  They 
asked industry to reorganize, rationalize and reallocate resources, capital and labor among them-
selves.  Compulsory regimes of rationalization, reorganization and reallocation were eschewed in 
favor of the encouragement of cooperative schemes encouraging the formation of trade associa-
tions.  These trade associations were encouraged by the prospect of being able to engage the 
government in negotiations.  Such negotiations had the potential to produce tariff protections, 
subsidies, tax concessions or import quotas that were favorable to the members of the trade asso-
ciations (following Olson's interest group theories of collective action).  Hall (1986) cites the 
Coal Mines Act of 1930, which created a government-recognized and empowered cartel protect-
ing British corporate coal interests as a typical example of the British preferences for state / in-
dustry relations. 
Such a set of preferences would lead the analyst to expect the British to take a similar, 
hands-off approach to the decisions about extracting North Sea oil.  Instead, what is seen is a 
closed-envelope auction system, favoring some producers over others based on non-market 
points of their exploration proposal.  The process was not reliant wholly on the market auction 
principles which would have led the highest bidder to win the rights to explore and extract from 
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any given allocation.  Furthermore, the process was not transparent at all: given the import of 
transparency and availability of information to prospective investors, this is surprising from a 
state with such generally pro-market preferences. 
 
5.2.3 The United Kingdom: Initial Conditions – International Prices 
Table 5: Global Crude Oil Prices & British Production - 1965 to 1978 
 
Year Price ($nominal) Price ($2008) 
Production (Mil-
lion tons per 
year) 
Production 
(thousand bar-
rels per day) 
1965 1.80 12.34 0.1 2 
1966 1.80 11.97 0.1 2 
1967 1.80 11.66 0.1 2 
1968 1.80 11.19 0.1 2 
1969 1.80 10.62 0.1 2 
1970 1.80 10.02 0.2 4 
1971 2.24 11.97 0.2 5 
1972 2.48 12.83 0.3 8 
1973 3.29 16.01 0.4 9 
1974 11.58 50.78 0.4 10 
1975 11.53 46.34 1.6 34 
1976 12.80 48.62 12.2 253 
1977 13.92 49.65 38.3 792 
1978 14.02 46.47 54.0 1119 
(Source: BP Statistical Review of Energy, 2009) 
As seen from table 5, at the time of discovery, prices were quite low abroad and were, in 
real terms, falling.  Between the point of discovery (1965) and the point at which production first 
landed oil on the shore (1970), prices fell from the 2008 equivalent of $12.34 to the 2008 equiva-
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lent of $10.02 (18.66%).  The British government expected oil prices to continue to fall (Lee, 
1965).  The low international prices reduce the rents that the British government would have 
been able to extract from foreign consumers of oil, and thus reduce its rent-seeking motive. The 
low prices correlate with the low level of government participation in extraction, confirming in-
ternational price hypothesis b. 
 
5.2.4 The United Kingdom: Initial Conditions – Domestic Demand 
 
Table 6: British Energy Consumption 
 
Year 
Production  
MTO/year 
Consumption 
MTO / year 
Total Consump-
tion MTOE / 
year 
1965 0.1 74.2 196.8 
1966 0.1 79.5 197.5 
1967 0.1 85.3 197.2 
1968 0.1 90.4 204.3 
1969 0.1 97.3 211.8 
1970 0.2 103.6 216.7 
1971 0.2 104.3 212.8 
1972 0.3 110.5 215.8 
1973 0.4 113.2 226.3 
1974 0.4 105.3 215.0 
1975 1.6 92.0 202.8 
1976 12.2 91.4 206.8 
1977 38.3 92.0 210.6 
1978 54.0 94.0 211.4 
(Source: BP Statistical Review of Energy, 2009) 
 
At the point of discovery, the overall energy production of the United Kingdom was only 
109.8 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) (OECD Factbook, 2008). Domestic oil production 
accounted for only 182,500 (.2 million tons) of that. On the other side of the equation, however, 
by the time the first North Sea oil was landed in 1970, the United Kingdom consumed 103.6 mil-
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lion tons of oil alone per year. The North Sea product, then, was only an additional 100,000 tons, 
or barely one-tenth of one percent of the quantity demanded domestically.   
Further, unlike the Netherlands, where natural gas accounted for 3% of the total energy 
demanded at the time the first Groningen gas was landed, in the United Kingdom, oil accounted 
for 16% of the total energy demanded at the time of discovery.  Oil consumption was rising, as 
well: six years earlier, oil had been only 11% of total energy demand. (Lee, 1965).  The expecta-
tion for the period between 1964 and 1970 was for a 100% increase, to 85 MTOE per year, about 
22% of the total energy demanded in the UK at 1965 levels. (ibid.) 
The high and increasing level of domestic demand further reduces the government’s level 
of participation in production.  The Wilson government of 1965 held only a narrow majority of 
only four seats, making retaining power as Prime Minister in any upcoming election difficult. 
Wilson, further, faced opposition from within his own government when the idea of a British Na-
tional Oil Corporation was suggested at the national Labour convention in 1968.  the Minister of 
Power at the time, Roy Mason, writing that the Study Group proposing BNOC did not “…pay 
sufficient regard to the risks associated with a venture of this kind, the heavy calls on capital, and 
the technical problems of entering into this highly specialized field.  There are a number of ways 
of securing a greater public stake in the North Sea without establishing a new public body” (Ma-
son, 1968, p. 2).  
The level of privatization selected by the British Government favored private industry 
over government participation.  This position confirms additive variables hypothesis three.  
When international prices are low and domestic demand is high, then the state selecting the pri-
vatization institution will favor higher levels of privatization. 
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5.3 Norway 
5.3.1 Overview: Institutional Characteristics 
Norway’s earliest oil was found in the Ekofisk field, discovered by Philips Petroleum, in 
1969.  Production came online in 1971 using tankers. The Norwegian oil reserves were difficult 
to get at, lying in the deepest part of the North Sea.  As in the United Kingdom and in the Neth-
erlands, Norway built pipelines to make transportation more efficient.   
 Norway formed a state owned oil company, Statoil, in 1972.  Statoil not only began to 
carry out exploration in the North Sea, but as a state-owned enterprise, entered into production 
agreements with multinational oil corporations to which Norway had already granted exploration 
and development licenses since 1965 (when oil was first found in the British region of the North 
Sea).  Statoil initially controlled only 20% of the oil produced in the Norwegian North Sea, but 
the laws governing extraction and the charter of the new state owned enterprise had stipulations 
in it that Statoil would become the dominant producer in Norwegian seas. This dominance would 
rise to grant Statoil 75% ownership of the extraction process, and would accomplish de facto na-
tionalization of Norwegian oil both directly and through a series of joint ventures. 
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Table 7: Norwegian Institutional Design Options 
 
Regime Prefer-
ences 
Initial Condi-
tions (global) 
Initial Condi-
tions (domes-
tic) 
Predicted 
State / Mar-
ket Weight 
Interventionist High Price High Demand S > M 
Interventionist High Price Low Demand S > M 
Interventionist Low Price High Demand S > M 
Interventionist Low Price Low Demand S > M 
Laissez-Faire High Price High Demand M ≈ S 
Laissez-Faire High Price Low Demand M > S 
Laissez-Faire Low Price Low Demand M > S 
Laissez-Faire Low Price High Demand M ≈ S 
 
 
5.3.2 Norway: Preferences and Regime Type 
The Norwegian path to independence, industrialization and democracy is very dissimilar 
to those paths taken by the UK and the Netherlands.  While the Netherlands was effectively a 
colony of the French until 1813, its previous experience in the Hanseatic League and success 
with the Dutch East India Company gave it a uniquely Dutch economic base, and, importantly, a 
history of corporate investment (and associated legal structures).  The UK had not been a colony, 
but rather a colonist, controlling nearly 1/5 of the world's surface land at the time of its industri-
alization.  Norway, on the other hand, was a tributary of Denmark from 1537 to 1814.
7
  As a re-
sult, unlike the UK and unlike the Netherlands, Norway's economy was "...monocultural, un-
skilled, [raw-materials] based and rather much like an enclave" (Hveem, 1991, p. 6) cut off from 
                                                          
7
 After the Danes (allies of Napoleon) lost the Napoleonic wars in 1814, Norway was transferred 
as a colony to Sweden, which allowed significantly greater autonomy to its new acquisition, but 
also continued the Danes' mercantilist economic policies. 
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the avenues of development on continental Europe.  Norwegian industrialization would come to 
rely heavily on those avenues in the 2nd half of the 19th century. Much of the physical and tech-
nological capital that Norway would utilize in its industrialization would come as direct imports 
from the UK or Germany (Hveem, 1991).  Large scale industrialization would not begin until the 
1880s, well after the adoption of the Norwegian constitution and its accompanying social demo-
cratic principles (Wicken, 2007). 
The Norwegian constitution exemplifies the core of Nordic social democracy.  The root 
elements of Norwegian social democracy tie to Norway's centralized and institutional state prin-
ciples.   The centralized state tradition combines with the institutional state tradition in Norway, 
explaining the state government as a group of professional decision makers working on behalf of 
a society that is a 'moral community' that goes through the "...gradual development of identities, 
loyalties, norms and values in political and administrative institutions."  (Christensen, T., 2003 p. 
172)  The centralized state tradition of Norway emphasizes conscious, central control of design, 
redesign and implementation of public structures by political and administrative agents of citi-
zens.  This emphasis "...covers both the constitutional design of public powers and the internal 
organization of public bodies" (ibid.)  
The centralized Norwegian state tradition is augmented by the institutional state tradition.  
The core of the institutional state principles is the Norwegian negotiated economy, which defines 
the structure of state / market relationships.  A negotiated economy "...works through an institu-
tional setup, where advisory boards consisting of stakeholders advise the relevant Minister. For-
mally, the system is centralised, but in reality the stakeholders have a strong voice" (Christensen, 
A-S., Nielsen and Olesen, 2007, p. 551). 
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The combination of the centralized and institutional principles helps explain a tendency 
on the part of the cabinet and parliament (Storting) toward cooperative decision making and con-
sensus, low levels of conflict, and high levels of shared values, while also reflecting individual-
ized characteristics of particular ministries (Christensen, T., 2003).  This might be compared to 
the Dutch system, which gives the government a strong voice in corporate decision-making, but 
acts more as a hyper-alert watchdog protecting the public interest, not as a sheepdog herding the 
companies in pro-social directions. Certainly the Norwegian 'sheepdog' approach to state / mar-
ket structures is far removed from the British 'retriever' approach, which relied on a carrot and 
stick approach to attempt to get industry to engage government in mere dialogue (much less fol-
low government's lead). 
The central and institutional state identities in Norway developed simultaneously and 
parallel to one another.  In the central and institutional view, the creation "...of a good society 
and enhancing moral progress" (Christensen 2003, p. 174) was a critical and central role for the 
state.  Indeed, the importance of the existence of  "...an interventionist state that would steer a 
capitalist economy by means of major economic development programmes based both on eco-
nomic theory and economic indicators" (ibid., p. 167) dates to 1873.  The evolution of the social 
welfare state, with its broad range of entitlements and benefits, is a logical progression from such 
a conception of the state's identity.  A critical element of this social welfare state was commit-
ment to full employment (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  The interventionist state in Norway moved 
proactively toward fulfillment of this commitment on a progressive and forward moving trajecto-
ry.  The discovery of oil in the North Sea would prove critical to the fulfillment of this goal.   
In light of this goal and the path of the Norwegian centralized and institutional state with 
its negotiated economy, it would not be unreasonable for the analyst to expect a state dominated 
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exploration and extraction industry.  One might go so far as to expect oil to be wholly controlled 
by some variety of state owned enterprise.  Certainly the formation of a state owned enterprise 
would be less complicated than entering into joint ventures -- yet that is precisely what Norway 
did.  Statoil, the Norwegian state oil company, was a partner in all exploration and extraction 
ventures in the Norwegian portion of the North Sea -- but it was not entirely in control of those 
ventures.  The path of the institutional and centralized state was somehow routed on to a detour -
- just as the paths of the Dutch quasi-corporatist state and the laissez-faire British state were. 
5.3.3 Norway: Initial Conditions – International Prices 
Table 8: Global Crude Oil Prices & Norwegian Production - 1965 to 1978 
 
Year 
Price 
($nominal) 
Price 
($2008) 
Production 
(Million 
tons per 
year) 
Production 
(thousand 
barrels per 
day) 
1965 1.80 12.34 - - 
1966 1.80 11.97 - - 
1967 1.80 11.66 - - 
1968 1.80 11.19 - - 
1969 1.80 10.62 - - 
1970 1.80 10.02 - - 
1971 2.24 11.97 0.3 6 
1972 2.48 12.83 1.6 33 
1973 3.29 16.01 1.6 32 
1974 11.58 50.78 1.7 35 
1975 11.53 46.34 9.2 189 
1976 12.80 48.62 13.7 279 
1977 13.92 49.65 14.0 287 
1978 14.02 46.47 17.4 356 
Source: BP Statistical review of World Energy, 2009 
  
As in the United Kingdom, at the time of the Norwegian discovery, oil prices were quite 
low.  Between the point of discovery (1969) and the point at which production first saw oil land-
ed on the shore (1971), prices fell from the 2008 equivalent of $10.62 to the 2008 equivalent of 
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$10.02, then rose to the 2008 equivalent of $11.97 (an increase of 19.46%).  Although prices had 
begun to rise, the first significant price spike from OPEC I did not occur until 1974, when they 
increased by 350% from $3.29 to $11.58 (nominal).  The Norwegians, then, were able to observe 
a price change that resembled a parabola: prices dropped from a low point to a lower point, then 
moved to a price point higher than the initial point and continued to climb.  In the absence of 
demand changes, this should lead a center-left government to push for a regime in which the lev-
el of privatization is higher. 
 
5.3.4 Norway: Initial Conditions – Domestic Demand 
 
Table 9: Norwegian Energy Consumption 
 
Year 
Oil Consump-
tion MT year 
Hydro con-
sumption 
MTOE 
Tot Consump-
tion MTOE year 
1965 5.2 11.2 17.3 
1966 5.9 11.0 17.8 
1967 6.1 12.1 19.0 
1968 6.7 13.6 21.3 
1969 7.4 13.0 21.5 
1970 8.3 13.1 22.4 
1971 8.2 14.5 23.7 
1972 8.5 15.4 24.8 
1973 8.6 16.7 25.7 
1974 7.7 17.3 25.6 
1975 8.0 17.5 26.1 
1976 9.0 18.6 28.1 
1977 8.9 16.3 26.1 
1978 9.3 18.3 28.5 
Source: BP Statistical review of World Energy, 2009 
 
 
Two sources of data dominate research into early North Sea exploration.  The first is Brit-
ish Petroleum’s annual Statistical Review of World Energy; the second, the Organization for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development’s statistical data set. Unlike BP, the OECD breaks 
down energy use by type and industry. E.g., both BP and the OECD sets can tell the analyst that 
20% of a given country’s energy comes from coal, but the OECD will tell the analyst that 40% 
of that coal went into industry, and 25% into transportation. 
Table 10: British v. Norwegian Energy Consumption, 1965-1978 
 
Year 
British 
Consumption 
MTO 
British Total 
Consumption 
MTOE 
British 
% 
energy 
met by 
oil 
Norwegian 
Consumption 
MTO 
Norwegian 
Total Con-
sumption 
MTOE 
Norwegian 
% 
energy 
met by 
oil 
1965 66.111 414.6787 5.94% 2.888 9.350866 30.88% 
1966 71.722 399.69 7.94% 3.073 9.599718 32.01% 
1967 73.531 390.3827 8.84% 3.089 9.968558 30.99% 
1968 83.1 392.6241 1.17% 4.856 12.2363 39.69% 
1969 91.699 403.836 2.71% 5.268 12.90133 40.83% 
1970 101.964 408.28 4.97% 5.792 13.568 42.69% 
1971 105.394 403.6753 6.11% 5.811 13.58381 42.78% 
1972 107.124 358.5126 9.88% 6.45 14.52872 44.39% 
1973 113.221 396.2591 8.57% 6.497 14.73663 44.09% 
1974 109.776 369.9736 9.67% 6.329 15.18586 41.68% 
1975 92.919 355.2989 6.15% 7.66 16.5505 46.28% 
1976 98.061 363.7886 6.96% 8.458 17.8482 47.39% 
1977 93.728 360.636 5.99% 8.463 17.55389 48.21% 
1978 94.14 355.5068 2.48% 8.41 17.08948 49.21% 
Source: Stats.OECD.org, December 6, 2011, author’s calculations . 
 
OECD aggregate figures indicate that Norway’s energy demands were more oil depend-
ent than the UK’s were.  On average, BP figures that 32.85% of Norway’s energy was met by oil 
between 1965 and 1978, and the UK  45.44%.  For the same period, the OECD’s figures for 
Nowegian oil consumption average to 41.51% and the UK 24.38%.  This would initially suggest 
that the hypothesis suggesting that states are averse to dominating extraction when domestic de-
mand for a product is high is not supported by the Norwegian experience 
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However, what BP figures do not show is the use of the oil. On average, between 1960 
and 1978, 41.96% of Norway’s oil went into transportation: planes, trains and automobiles. For 
the same period in the UK, only 25.45% of the oil went to transportation.  At the time of Norwe-
gian discovery, 1969, the UK used 21.68% of its oil in transportation: the Norwegians used 
37.18%.  Further, although Norwegian transportation in 1969 used a greater percentage of Nor-
way’s energy than British transportation (15.87% vs. 5.42%), the total MTO used for transporta-
tion in Norway was, on average, 9% of the MTO used for transportation in Britain.  
The UK, on the other hand, never used less than 70% of its oil for purposes other than 
transportation between 1960 and 1978.  This speaks to a much more diversified economy. More 
and different types of industries used oil in the UK than did in Norway (which, in an average 
year for the period, used 58% of its oil in something other than transportation). Because Norwe-
gian oil uses were highly concentrated into a single field (transportation), the aggregate econom-
ic demand for energy was met by sources other than oil.   This is backed up by the diversity of 
energy sources in the two countries, as well as their GDP aggregate and per capita figures.   
By OECD figures, in 1969, 66.31% of Britain’s energy came from coal, with the balance 
split between oil (22.71%), natural gas (5.88%), hydroelectric and nuclear power (5.1%).  Coal is 
labor intensive, and thus voter intensive. In such a concentrated energy field, any increase in get-
ting energy from oil will necessarily reduce the percentage provided by coal, and, barring signif-
icant economic expansion, cause greater coal-related unemployment. British GDP growth across 
the period of discovery (1965) to production (1970) was 2.2% (nominal), which, given that infla-
tion over the period averaged 3.5%, meant the economy was functionally shrinking 1.3% a year. 
This strongly suggests that a rational political actor, wanting to maintain office for as long as 
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possible, would not put resources or significant subsidies into a field that would cause the unem-
ployment of its voter base.    
Norway had a significantly more diversified energy infrastructure than the UK did: 19% 
coal, 1% natural gas, 40% hydro and 40% oil.   While hydroelectric construction is labor inten-
sive, it’s one-time.  One does not demand to build a new dam every year to run the same power 
plant as last year.  Further, the civil engineering construction skills from dam building carry over 
relatively easily to building off-shore oil platforms.  Norway’s economy’s growth was not keep-
ing pace with inflation (3.1% nominal growth on average per year vs. 3.69% inflation,) the rate 
of contraction was less than half of that of Britain’s.  
In an average year between 1960 and 1978, Norway’s GDP was 8.2% of the UK’s, sug-
gesting a much smaller economy – but Norwegian per capita GDP was on average 117.82% of 
the British per capita GDP.  The population and economy of Norway was so much smaller than 
the economy and population of Britain that barring the deliberate development of a petrochemi-
cal industry, the demand for oil in Norway would never exceed 10% of the demand for oil in the 
UK.  Such a small level of demand reinforces the hypothesis that when decision makers do not 
have to fear retaliation at the ballot box either directly by oil-consuming voters or their oil-
consuming employers, the institutional designer can give way to his rent-seeking instincts. 
Demand for oil in Norway stayed low, never rising to 9 MTO a year. Lacking significant 
domestic demand for the product, the Norwegian government was in a stronger position to pres-
sure the producers on government participation. If domestic demand for the oil had been high, 
then government dominance of extraction could be seen as an effort to rent-seek from Norwe-
gians, as opposed to Europeans.  Simultaneously, the low domestic demand meant there was no 
strong pressure for the Norwegian government to provide the necessary public energy good of oil 
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to Norwegian voters and industry.  Because the Norwegian government did not demand to fear 
retribution from voters rooted in energy policy, it was able to hold fast against oil companies 
who wanted to explore Norwegian waters.  The low domestic demand and lower level of privati-
zation confirms domestic demand hypothesis b.   
With low domestic demand for the oil, the Norwegian government could push for a stronger role 
in the production process than the UK could.  This would appeal to the state from a rent-seeking 
perspective. By participating directly in the production process through joint ventures, the Nor-
wegian government directly accrued rents from sales of oil abroad.  The diversified energy struc-
ture as well as concentration of oil use meant that Norway’s discovery moved it from a net im-
porter to net exporter of oil. Despite the relatively low prices of the period, production was still 
profitable:  such profits could (and were) directly put into the expansion of the Norwegian wel-
fare state.  By forming state-owned and joint-state-owned ventures, the Norwegian government 
was able to directly intervene in the employment market of Norway in both the post-production 
industries of refining, trade and finance and the industries derived from oil such as construction, 
welding, and oil-equipment manufacture. Because the ventures were joint efforts between the 
Norwegian government and private industry, risks associated with potential exploration disasters 
(such as the Piper Alpha explosion of 1988) and economic risks associated with price volatility 
were shared.   The Norwegian regime of moderate state participation with low international pric-
es and low domestic demand supports confirmation of additive variable hypothesis two. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The wide variety in the Dutch, British and Norwegian institutions designed in reaction to the 
North Sea windfalls can be explained by looking to the governments’ preferences, the interna-
tional prices and domestic demand levels facing the three states. Of the eight potential combina-
tions, three are evident in the North Sea.  The Dutch government was interventionist and facing 
high international prices paired with low domestic demand. The United Kingdom’s government 
at the time of discovery was more laissez-faire, and facing low international prices paired with 
high domestic demand.  Norway’s interventionist government found oil when international pric-
es and domestic demand were low.  Each government selected a level of privatization corre-
sponding to the additive influence of the independent variables. 
The center-left Dutch government reflected a cultural tendency toward intervention in the 
private market in order to maintain a general level of social welfare. Left on its own, the gov-
ernment would have preferred to dominate the entire extraction and production process.  This 
interventionist government saw the discovery of natural gas within the Gronigen seabed at a time 
when natural gas prices were relatively high.  Absent an interventionist government, these high 
prices should have led to a low level of privatization, consistent with international prices hypoth-
esis a.  On the other side, however, Dutch domestic demand for natural gas at the same time was 
low.  Taken on its own, the demand level should have also led to higher levels of government 
participation, consistent with domestic demand hypothesis b.   In combination with the interven-
tionist-leaning Dutch government, the institution governing getting natural gas out of the seabed 
favored private market actors.  Once the gas was out of the ground, however, the Dutch govern-
ment’s dominant position in the transportation part of the production process intervened.  This 
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results in an institution with the overwhelming control of extraction in the hands of the state. 
This would confirm additive hypothesis four. 
Oil prices at the time of the British discovery were relatively low.  In a vacuum, these low 
prices would push the government to design an institution with a high level of privatization, 
matching international price hypothesis b.  Domestic demand for oil, on the other hand, was high 
and climbing and spreading into a myriad of industries.  Again, this should lead to high levels of 
privatization, tying to domestic demand hypothesis a.  The institution as designed by the British 
government left extraction largely in the hands of the private actors.  This high level of privatiza-
tion is consistent with additive hypothesis three. 
In Norway, prices of oil at the time of discovery were also relatively low. On its own, these 
high prices should have led to high levels of privatization (consistent with international price hy-
pothesis b).  Norwegian domestic demand for oil, however, was not only low but concentrated.  
The bulk of the state’s energy demands were met by hydroelectric power and coal, and the bulk 
of its oil went into transportation.  The domestic demand level should have led to a low level of 
privatization (consistent with domestic demand hypothesis b).  The Norwegian government 
formed a state owned enterprise, Statoil, with which every firm had to form a joint venture in 
order to explore and extract oil from the Norwegian territory of the North Sea.  The Norwegian 
state was a significant, but not dominant partner in extraction, producing a moderate level of pri-
vatization.  This level of privatization is consistent with additive hypothesis two. 
Further study is clearly warranted. As seen by the Dutch example, not only does direct own-
ership of the extraction process impact the balance of control, but so do the transactions associat-
ed with the process. The British example – especially once one considers the Thatcherite revolu-
tion of 1979 – demonstrates that the initial design is not the end of the story.  The political expla-
55 
nation for ring-fencing and the change of the accounting system in Britain could offer further 
explanatory power.  The Norwegians, finally, have demonstrated that end use of the revenues 
generated by the institution matter a great deal to the institution’s maintenance.  Changes in in-
ternational market conditions may prove critical in operation of and changes in the institutions 
over time.  One option might be to expand the set to other industrialized, democratized states and 
other windfalls, such as the innovation of fracking in the US, or more efficient mechanisms of oil 
extraction in the Canadian tar sands.  Examination of the institutions over time, and their changes 
will likely lead to a time-series data set that offers a predictive model that might prove critical to 
democratizing states with resource curses.  
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